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III. Executive	  Summary	  
The Swiss clock & watch industry has been the indisputable leader worldwide during 
many decades in terms of excellence and notoriety. Many challengers such as 
Japanese or American companies, tried to compete at the same level without dazzling 
success thus far. However, three main competitions had significant impacts on the 
Swiss industry over the years. The first was the new production process of American 
companies that forced Swiss companies to shift from an artisanal production to a mass 
production factory system in the late 19th century. The second came the Japanese 
watches quartz innovation that obliged Switzerland to differentiate its products with a 
“Swiss Made” label for protection. The last and current competition is coming from 
Mainland China which is omnipresent in the low-end segment, having the largest 
production of watches in terms of volume, and that is willing to upgrade its production 
to high-end segments. Under this third competitor, the Swiss clock & watch industry is 
once more challenged.  
This paper focuses on the understanding of the competition that the Swiss industry is 
currently facing and identifying the levels of threat on the different steps of the value 
chain. Comparing the previous Japanese competition with the current Chinese 
competition will lead us to the identification of the imperfections of the Swiss industry in 
which competitors found a failure or an opportunity in order to contest some market 
shares.  
In the first part of the analysis, different threats are distinctly identified at different 
stages of the value chain. For example, Chinese firms bring a serious menace in the 
upstream stages of the value chain in raw material production, intermediary 
manufacturing, and assembling. Whereas there is a lack of know-how when it comes to 
market and communicating the brand to the end consumers. Moreover, the help of the 
local government is non-negligible for the future growth of Chinese watch brands.  
In the second part, several similarities and differences between the previous and 
current competitions are determined. It comes as no surprise that the low-end segment 
is the most vulnerable. The Swiss industry was strongly challenged in this segment by 
Japan as well as by China. In addition to that, Switzerland has not been protecting 
enough its products and is still struggling to improve it. Last but not least, technological 
innovation is and will always be a factor that could call into question the industry, 
talking about the quartz revolution in the past and the possible smartwatch revolution 
nowadays, which could not be measured for the moment. 
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1. Background	  
1.1. Global	  clock	  &	  watch	  industry	  overview	  
1.1.1. A	  brief	  history	  of	  the	  sector	  
 
Dutch and English sailors who began to dominate the oceans from the half of the 17th 
century, thanks to larger ships, needed marine chronometers to better calculate 
distances. Until the mid-seventeenth century, clocks were inaccurate and often 
contained a single needle. Progresses in 1670 were made with the first watch having 
spiral spring provided with a balance. These advances were reflected in Europe too. 
Daniel Jeanrichard located in Ste-Croix in the Swiss Jura, created its first watch in 
1681, copied from an English model discovered in 1679. Later, he formed dozens of 
artisans. The English watchmaking then developed. Daniel Quare who in 1686 adapted 
the hand to the center of the dial. So far, only the hour was used. In 1700, still in 
England, the use of drilled stones as pivot bearing for balance is a leap forward in 
technology. The Geneva watchmaking built its domination over Europe in the second 
quarter of the 18th century. In the previous thirty years, the Huguenots, fleeing 
persecution after the Edict of Fontainebleau in 1685, had introduced the English 
innovations. Since then, Swiss production remained in the hands of independent 
watchmakers or small-specialized workshops and this until the mid-nineteenth century. 
The custom was that the master watchmaker presented a very neat piece before 
receiving his watchmaker certificate. Each craftsman was dedicated to the manufacture 
of a special component and apprentices were specialized in manufacturing of the 
movement, according to the archives of the Swiss movement watches. In 1927, a 
telecommunications engineer named Warren Morrisson researched a system to 
generate highly stable frequencies. It was based on the piezoelectric effect of quartz to 
build more reliable watches than the old mechanical clock systems. The consequence 
was that quartz watches would reach an accuracy of one thousandth of a second per 
day. To meet greater precision requirements, atomic clocks were created in 1947. In 
1967, the trade of the first quartz watch to the public opened many opportunities for 
Japanese manufacturers. It became the specialty of Seiko Japanese watch brand, 
created in 1881 by Kintaro Hattori. In 1937, Seiko had crossed the threshold of more 
than 2 million watches sold worldwide, and in 1941 it produced the first pocket 
chronograph in Japan before reaching a leading position in the 1950s in the watch 
market.  
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1.1.2. Current	  global	  production	  and	  trade	  
 
There is no data on world production of watches. If it can be estimated at about 1.2 
billion pieces, export and import results are higher because a product may be re-
exported and thus be counted twice. However, these data reflect very well the forces 
involved and help to identify trends facing the industry worldwide. The major routes that 
can be identified are between Switzerland, Hong Kong, and China (see figure 6).  
Switzerland remained the largest exporter of timepieces in 2013. It exported $ 23.6 
billion worldwide. Compared to 2012, this corresponds to an increase of 1.9% in local 
currency (excluding currency’s effects). Second, Hong Kong exported or re-exported 
watchmakers products up to $ 10.0 billion, an increase of 3.7% in local currency. The 
main destinations were the United States, Switzerland and China in relatively equal 
proportions. It was followed by Macao and Japan, among others. China has also been 
a major player in watchmaking exports. 7.9% of growth in local currency registered a 
total value of $ 5.6 billion. Chinese watch exports went to Hong Kong, the United 
States and Japan. France saw its watch exports reached $ 2.4 billion; a large part of it 
was made up of re-exports, mainly to other European markets. This result exceeded by 
7.2% the value realized in 2012. In fifth position, Germany exported the equivalent of $ 
2.4 billion, an increase of 10.8%. (See table 1). 
 
In 2013, Hong Kong absorbed most of world trades, before sending them partly to 
other markets. Its watch imports totaled $ 10.4 billion, virtually identical to those of 
2012 (-0.5% in local currency). The United States has brought into their territory the 
equivalent of $ 5.2 billion. These imports increased by 6.0% in a year. Confirming the 
slowdown in China, its watch imports declined 7.9%; they were about $ 3.9 billion. 
Swiss imports of watches and components were $ 3.7 billion. This offshore sourcing 
has the same trend as exports, an increase of 2.1%. France occupied the fifth position, 
with a value of $ 3.1 billion (+ 3.6%) (See table 1). (FHS, 2014) 
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Table 1 - Import/Export of watches by countries in 2013 (ITC Trade map 2015) 
	   	  	  Countries	   Value	  imported	  in	  2013	  
(USD	  thousand)	  
	   World	   50,763,026	  
1	   Hong	  Kong,	  China	   9,941,623	  
2	   United	  States	  of	  America	   5,236,762	  
3	   China	   3,903,174	  
4	   Switzerland	   3,756,424	  
5	   France	   3,060,751	  
6	   Japan	   2,936,277	  
7	   Germany	   2,882,571	  
8	   Singapore	   1,958,381	  
9	   Italy	   1,741,637	  
10	   United	  Kingdom	   1,715,959	  
 
	  	  	   	  	  	  Countries	   Value	  exported	  in	  2013	  	  
(USD	  thousand)	  
	   World	   45,969,450	  
1	   Switzerland	   23,554,552	  
2	   China	   5,568,388	  
3	   France	   2,395,946	  
4	   Germany	   2,379,767	  
5	   Italy	   1,784,957	  
6	   Singapore	   1,708,363	  
7	   Hong	  Kong,	  China	   1,458,859	  
8	   United	  States	  of	  America	   1,231,306	  
9	   Japan	   1,079,773	  
10	   United	  Kingdom	   799,542	  
 
Hong Kong occupies a prominent place in world trade watches; regarding exports of 
watches and watch components, the former British colony ranks second behind 
Mainland China quantitatively and second behind Switzerland in terms of turnover 
(2012: 357.2 million of units exported, turnover of 9.6 billion USD). However, it should 
be noted that Hong Kong does not manufacture almost anything but acts as a hub of 
world trade watches. As a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of 
China, it is a separate customs area and pursues its own trade policy. The port city 
sees no tariffs, which makes it a storage and distribution center very popular for 
watches’ producers. Relations are particularly close and sustained with Switzerland 
and China. Foreign watches (for example Swiss) are re-exported from Hong Kong to 
other Asian countries, including China. Conversely, numerous quartz watches and 
watch components made in China transit through Hong Kong before going abroad, 
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especially in the United States, as well as in Switzerland, or return to China (Crédit 
Suisse, 2013).	  
1.2. Swiss	  clock	  &	  watch	  industry	  overview	  
	  
Just like watches, the Swiss watch industry is characterized by a complex structure, 
based on a division of labor in continual progression. Originally, watchmakers were 
making the full development of a watch (movement and transmission). Fragmented 
manufacture progressed in the seventeenth century. The notion of interchangeability 
was known in the Jura from 1770. That's when the first machine tools for mechanical 
manufacturing a standard outline emerged, thanks to the innovation made by Frédéric 
Japy in the Jura Franche-Comté. However, the Swiss drafts-based factories 
progressed slowly in the standardization and standardization of component parts and 
thus in the mechanization of production. The long quest for interchangeability marked 
the entire nineteenth century, encountered setbacks and half success. 
 
It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that profound changes in the production 
system contributeed to the renewal of regional economic and social fabric: the 
transition from a traditional watchmaking production to a factory production was the 
response to progress made by the Americans since the middle of the century in 
standardization, machining of components and mass production of cheap watches.  
 
The American competition was nearly fatal to the Swiss industry (exports of watches in 
the US fell by 18.3 million francs in 1872 to 4 million in 1877-1878). It was in the 
Bernese Jura and the Jura Mountains that were set the technical and organizational 
foundations of large-scale manufacturing. This gave rise to new centers, where some 
large factories edify themselves, bringing to their site hundreds of workers, not 
specially trained or qualified, enrolled in a predominantly rural area. In 1883, there 
were about 97 watches institutions subject to the Federal Law on the work in the 
factory, 46 of them are located in the canton of Berne and 11 others in the canton of 
Solothurn. 
 
The Swiss reaction to the American competition turned to be very flexible. It all began 
with the American Waltham’s automated screw machine that was delivering a similar 
quality than the Swiss watch screws, but at a faster pace therefore in larger amount. 
The Swiss reaction had therefore a dual mode of development. On the one hand, some 
continued to cultivate advanced watchmaking horlogerie (luxury watches, special 
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finishes, manual and "complications", and high precision accuracy). These companies 
most attached to the traditional professions would, on the other hand, coexist with 
integrated firms for mechanized production of medium and low range watches. This 
flexibility was tested by the severe 1921-1923 crisis, the global depression of the 1930s 
and the rise of protectionism. These circumstances precipitated a cartel movement that 
began in the inter-war period (holding companies emerged in the late 1920s, such as 
Ebauches SA or the Swiss Society for the watch industry) and lead to a major 
reorganization at a national scale. This movement, led to the financial and industrial 
sector concentration. The year 1931 saw the birth of the "superholding" General 
Society of Swiss watchmaking SA (named Asuag), a private organization bringing 
together in an almost monopoly the production of watches in Switzerland. Receiving 
the support of the federal authorities, the plan intended to fight against foreign 
competition and was characterized by conventional regulation of relations between 
industries. The second crisis that Switzerland faced was against Japan that started to 
produce quartz watches in the mid-20th century. Japanese companies took the major 
market share in the low-end segment, which represented the most important 
production in terms of units produced.  
 
Despite those serious crises, the Swiss watch industry has always occupied a 
prominent place in the world market. By 1870, it accounted for about three-quarters of 
world production in volume and two-thirds in value in the early twenty-first century. It 
always appears as a value as the first world exporter (16.2 billion francs in 2010 for a 
global manufacturing of watches, movements and basic pieces. In the international 
division of labor, it is therefore positioned clearly in the higher ranges, with prices and 
average costs significantly higher than those of other producers. With around 600 
companies, the watch industry in 2010 was the third largest Swiss export industries, 
behind machinery and chemicals. 1/3 of the people working in the sector in Switzerland 
were located in the canton of Neuchatel, where most of the major companies have set 
some of their production plants, if not the whole production (Fallet, 2015). 
 
This success has been based from the beginning on an inexhaustible capacity to adapt 
to changes in demand and an assiduous geographical diversification of opportunities. 
The map is continually redistributed following the option of global market fluctuations. 
In 2010, Europe and Asia were the main customers buying respectively 31% and 53% 
of Swiss production. While having maintained an undisputed leadership in the high-
end, Swiss watchmakers were forced from the middle of the 19th century, to deal with 
the modern mass consumption trends that were at the opposite of the luxury watch 
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industry that was producing fewer products. The First World War was very profitable for 
the sector; aircraft counters and timers for bombshells were required to be built at that 
time (Elginwatches.org, 2002). . 
 
Table 2 - Production of watches in 2013 (ITC Trade map 2015) 
	   Volume	  produced	  (units)	   Value	  ($)	  
Switzerland	   29.2	  million	   23.6	  billion	  
China	   663	  million	   5.6	  billion	  
Hong	  Kong	   354	  million	   1.4	  billion	  
 
As shown on table 2, Switzerland exported 29.2 million of finished watches in 2012, 
down 2.2% regarding the year 2011. It represents only 2.5% of the 1.2 billion watches 
produced worldwide in one year. It is almost nothing, at least in quantity. China holds 
the first rank in terms of quantity produced with 663 million pieces in 2012, which is the 
largest exporter of finished watches in the world. Followed by Hong Kong with 354 
million units. Switzerland appears in 3rd position. But this ranking is reversed when it 
comes to value: Switzerland, then becomes number one; 95% of Swiss watches are 
sold over 1,000 francs. Note that a Swiss watch cost on average $739 in 2012 ($688 in 
2011), against $3 on average for a watch from China. 
 
The Swiss watch industry has no equivalent in the world. If we take into account the 
latest annual report Swiss watch exports, it shows that in 2012, exports reached 21.4 
billion francs, up 10.9% compared to 2011. In 2011, they had already reached 19.3 
billion francs (+19.2%). Thus, despite an uneven economic environment worldwide, the 
facts are clear: Swiss watch exports confirmed the good health of the industry, who 
had two record years in succession (Crédit Suisse, 2013). 
 
In 2012, all export regions experienced a growth. Europe observed the strongest 
annual growth (+ 16.3%), representing a value of 6.5 billion francs. Absorbing 30% of 
Swiss watch exports, the Continent even took market share from Asia, which continues 
to absorb 54% of exports to 11.6 billion francs. Regarding the destinations by country, 
Hong Kong remained the largest market, which still served as a commercial hub for 
Asia and bought 20.4% of Swiss watches (up by 4.4 billion francs). Hong Kong was 
followed by the US (10.2%, 2.2 billion) and China, with a share of 7.7% to CHF 1.6 
billion. In Europe, Germany acquired for 1.2 billion francs of Swiss watches which is a  
significant increase (33.1% compared to 2011), and is ranked fifth in the standings 
(Crédit Suisse, 2013). 
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Today, the watch industry and microtechnology in Switzerland employs nearly 56,000 
people, a figure that increased by 5.7% in a year and has never been equaled for over 
35 years. We have to go back to 1975 and the beginning of the watchmaking crisis, to 
find a figure higher than in 2012 (exactly 55'816 employees). Since the 2010 census, 
the gain in labor amounts to 7'268 people (+ 15%). The loss of 4,800 jobs between late 
2008 and early 2010 is a distant memory. The top three most watchmaking cantons in 
terms of employees consist of Neuchâtel (15'323), Bern (11'184) and Geneva (9'358). 
Watchmaking can benefit on a high level of qualification of labor ; these qualifications 
are getting higher and higher. The proportion of workers with a higher education 
degree gathers 62.9% of the entire labor (61.5% in 2011), or two-thirds of the 
employees; 20 years ago, it only had one third. 
 
Between them, the Swatch Group, Richemont and Rolex constitute 45.8% of the global 
watch market and are considered as major key players in the industry. Fossil (USA) is 
in fourth position, it overtook the place of LVMH. The three largest Japanese 
watchmakers’ players (Citizen, Seiko and Casio) together have 9.4% of the market 
share, having still less shares than Rolex alone (Wthejournal.com, 2015).   
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1.3. Swiss	  trading	  partners	  in	  the	  sector	  
 
Geographical diversification opportunities of the Swiss watch industry has improved 
steadily between early 1990 and 2009. This reflects among others the growing 
importance of emerging markets for Swiss watch brands. The rapid rebound of the 
industry after the financial and economic crisis and the strong export growth of the past 
three years are mainly due to an already noticed presence in emerging markets, where 
demand for luxury goods just recorded a boom at that time.  
 
Asia has contributed the most by far to the increase in Swiss watch exports during the 
last decade. About 70% of the growth in the period 2000-2012 is indeed a credit to 
Asian countries. Hong Kong and China in the lead by providing more than 40% growth. 
Singapore, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), South Korea, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, and 
Japan are also among the 15 countries that contributed the most to the growth. An 
additional 24% was contributed by Europe, including France and Germany. The 
American continent contributed about 6%, the US by providing half (See Chart 1). 
 
 
Chart 1 - Main Export Markets of the Swiss Watch Industry (Crédit Suisse, 2013) 
 
 
The chart above (Chart 1) points out very distinctively the major players and trading 
partners of Switzerland. Hong Kong is the most important partner by far with 20% of 
the export going there. There is a trend that the trade routes are growing in the Eastern 
countries from Switzerland and the Western ones are decreasing. Hong Kong grew by 
6% from 2000 and 2012 as well as China that grew by 8%. Singapore and the other 
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Asian countries are the only ones (with China and Hong Kong) to keep growing their 
activities with Switzerland. The only Asian country that is decreasing is Japan by 
almost half of its import from Switzerland.  
 
In 2000, the United States still constitute the main market for the Swiss watch industry 
with a share of 18% of total exports, ahead of Hong Kong (14%) and Japan (9%). The 
importance of Mainland China was then negligible (0.4%). With the strong growth in 
Asia, the geographical distribution of Swiss watch exports, however, is heavily modified 
and this in the space of ten years. The trading hub in Asia is Hong Kong, which has 
overtaken the US as the largest market in 2008. In 2012, 20% of sales for export were 
generated in this Chinese special administrative region, twice as much as the United 
States. Growing at a very fast pace, China has climbed to third place in 2011. In 2012, 
it concentrated 8% of Swiss watch exports. If Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan is added, 
30% of exports now goes to the Chinese market, which is almost double in importance 
from 2000.  
 
The growing importance of the Chinese market is certainly a certain accumulation of 
risks for the industry, but it also opens up remarkable opportunities for growth. The rise 
of China as a production country can probably be explained, at least in part, by 
delocalization from Hong Kong and other producers to cross-border Guangdong 
Province. In China, the special economic zones are areas enjoying a special legal 
regime, which makes them more attractive to foreign investors. In 1979, four Chinese 
special economic zones were established in the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian in 
southern China to attract foreign investors. Those two provinces are, without surprise 
the two most important areas in terms of number of watch manufactures. They are 
located on the border of Hong Kong, and Macao that help trades with international 
firms that want to enter the Chinese market. These areas offer to foreign companies 
preferential terms (tariffs, free repatriation of investments and profits, no taxes for years 
and very low taxes, extraterritorial status for executives who come to work, etc.). It has 
been an important driver of reforms for foreign investors. In 2013, China has created a 
free trade zone in Pudong, which includes the international airport of Shanghai. 
Shenzhen area seems to follow the same path (English-pudong.gov.cn, 2015). Recent 
free trade agreements between Switzerland and China that will be applied in the near 
future, should not influence a major change in external trades as it will take place over 
a period of years, thus price reductions will not be meaningful. Moreover, the fast rising 
cost in China will persuades companies not to cut their prices (Shotter, 2014).  
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The map below (figure 1) shows the main hot spot of watch production firms across 
China. Without surprise Guangdong region is the main area because of its proximity to 
Hong Kong. The first firms started there before developing in the other coastal regions 
such as Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shandong regions. Foreign companies in China control 
half of the shares in the industry. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Distribution map of clock & watch production in China (Pan, A. 2012) 
 
 
 
On the chart below (chart 2), we can see the contribution to the Swiss watch export by 
regions. The trend that is evolving is clearly focused on the Asian continent with China 
as the leader. Even though, the trend is weakening for the last 3 years, the Asian 
countries played a very important role in the Swiss watch industry and trading 
relationships are becoming more and more powerful. The exports to a country do not 
necessarily correspond to sales to local end users. In some markets, business with 
foreign tourists indeed plays an important role. It is, for example the case in Hong 
Kong, Singapore or Dubai, as well as in Switzerland. European countries such as 
France with the capital of luxury Paris, Germany or Italy profit from these wealthy 
tourists buying watches. This explains the relatively large share of these countries in 
the Swiss watch exports. 
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Chart 2 - Contributions to Growth by World Regions (Crédit Suisse, 2013) 
 
 
Thus, the raising growth in Asian countries could be positively interpreted in the short 
term because it helps the watch industry and consequently the Swiss watch economy. 
But in the long term, this growth could become a threat to the Swiss industry as it could 
become more independent and start competing with Swiss high-end watches (Crédit 
Suisse, 2013). 
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2. Definitions	  
 
Watchmaking is divided into two distinct branches: luxury watches (haute horlogerie) 
and the fashion segment (low-end). The first includes all works whose complete 
perfection is the main merit. It is necessary that the machine, handled by a workman is 
accurate in all its parts. In contrast, the fashion segment focuses on the exterior forms 
of the watch. The idea of haute horlogerie is thus associated with its origin to 
excellence and product complications. But if we want to be more precise on the 
segmentation of the industry, it can be divided into four price categories: mass (Under 
USD $600), middle ($600 - $1’500), upper ($1’500 - $8’000), and luxury ($8000 and 
higher) watches. Watches in the low-end segment consist in most of the case of radio 
controlled and digital watches, whereas the high-end watches are mechanical watches. 
The key players and the most important countries that are concerned by the global 
clock & watch industry are Switzerland, Japan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China. 
Switzerland has the reputation and almost monopoly in the luxury segment, whereas 
Japan, Hong Kong, and China are very efficient and powerful in the low-end segment 
(Donzé, P. 2015). 
 
In order to understand the strategic choice of watch companies of where to produce 
and what key factors should be analyzed, the process of making a watch needs to be 
defined. When a company decides to delocalize or change its center of production, 
there is always a reason why it is done. First of all, every watch needs to be elaborated 
from computer design. Major brands, including Rolex, Swatch, and Patek Philippe have 
their own design offices within their company, but small independent design companies 
exist for brands that decide to outsource their design phase. Raw materials that can be 
used vary from the quality and price of the watches. Basic and low-end watches are 
made of plastic, titanium, or stainless steel, whereas luxurious watches are made of 
silver, gold, carbon, diamond, platinum, or ceramic. Thus, raw materials need to be 
accessible on the production/manufacture site. The manufacturing process is one of 
the most important parts and is divided into two parts. The first one is about shaping 
and tailoring the components of the watch. It can be hand-made or machine-made. The 
second one, which is the most important because it requires great knowledge and 
skills, is the process of manufacturing and assembling the watch components. Labor 
must be qualified to operate on specific machinery able to shape specific components. 
Thus, the location of this manufacture must be studied very cautiously because of the 
need of skilled labor and the availability of adequate machinery.  
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The quality control is the last step before the watch is shipped to retailers. It consists of 
checking possible defects in order to ensure high quality. This control can be made at 
the end of the production line for small and low end watches, but the most luxurious 
and important brands set the control at the earliest point of the manufacturing process 
(Madehow.com, 2015). 
 
The transfer of watch manufacturing technology was a difficult asset to handle for 
Switzerland. When Swiss companies saw a potential threat of Japanese companies 
between 1930 and 1960, it was already too late; they did not think that Japanese firms 
could compete against them by changing the roots of watchmaking with innovative 
ideas and the quartz battery. What is happening in Hong Kong and China nowadays is 
similar to the Japanese case at first sight. But more in depth analysis will help to 
identify similarities and differences about these two competitions. Swiss companies are 
pioneer on many domains in the clock & watch industry but the investments made 
internationally can raise the competition once those foreign companies have acquired 
enough knowledge and capital to work by themselves. Therefore Swiss brands have to 
manage the technology very carefully in order to have a control on investment made 
abroad (in China or Hong Kong for example).  
 
In order to defend Swiss products and more precisely Swiss watches, an “ordonnance” 
was made by the Swiss Federal Council in 1971: it is called “Swiss Made“ certification. 
It is the first time a Swiss watch was protected by law. To be considered as a Swiss 
watch and to receive the label, its movement must be Swiss, its movement must be 
cased up in Switzerland, and the manufacturer must carry out the final inspection in 
Switzerland. Regarding the movement, it must be assembled in Switzerland, inspected 
by the manufacturer in Switzerland, and the components of Swiss manufacture must 
account for at least 50 percent of the total value, without taking into account the cost of 
assembly (Ordonnance réglant l'utilisation du nom «Suisse» pour les montres, 1971). 
 
The Great Hong Kong region also known as the Greater Pearl Delta River is an 
economic center that regroups the Guangdong Province, including Shenzhen, 
Guangzhou, Foshan and Dongguan (in Mainland China), Hong Kong, and Macau (both 
Special Administrative Regions of the People's Republic of China). The region is one 
the most affluent market in Asia in terms of retail activities, but also in the 
production/manufacturing sector. This economic region is very comprehensive as it 
includes production hubs, retail centers, management and financial services, tourism 
industry and a transit platform that play a major role in the East Asia economy as well 
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as in the whole continent. It has emerged as one of the most dynamic economic 
regions in the world. It has specific trade agreements that help the cooperation 
throughout the region and make it very attractive for investors (Enright, 2005).  
 
 
Figure 2 - The Great Hong Kong Region (Enright, M. and Scott, E. 2005) 
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3. Research	  Questions	  
 
The author of this paper tries to address two core research questions as follows. 
 
Question I. How did the Swiss clock & watch industry face the competition from the 
Great Hong Kong region since the late 1970s onward? At what stage of the value chain 
it is a potential threat to Switzerland? 
 
The Swiss clock & watch industry was leading by far this market worldwide before 
1970. At that time 50% of the world watch market was held by the Swiss watch 
industry. The Swiss advantage compared to its main competitors was Switzerland’s 
neutral political position in World during the 20th century. The trigger that launched the 
beginning of the global competition started with the quartz innovation as a substitute of 
the mechanical movements that are most of the time more expensive to produce. 
Japanese companies, including Seiko were pioneers in this segment and the popularity 
of quartz battery was increasing year after year. In 1978, the number of quartz watches 
produced overtook the mechanical watches and resulted into a crisis in Switzerland 
that was not producing a lot of quartz movements at that time. This revolution 
stimulated new markets in Asia and in the United States, which raised the competition 
against the Swiss watch industry of mechanical watches versus quartz movements. 
Hong Kong and more recently Mainland China are the major regions that represent the 
most important threat to Switzerland, knowing that the Japanese market is loosing 
shares years after years. Thus, what are the actions and measures to counter this 
rising competition?   
 
Starting from this core question we can dig into more details concerning the new 
competition of Hong Kong and China that the Swiss industry faces. 
 
Question II. Is the Swiss industry facing new competition from neighbor China and 
Hong Kong, and less from its Japanese competitors as observed during the previous 
crisis in the 1970s? 
 
Is it only an issue following the delocalization of foreign production to China, or do we 
observe the rise of domestic Chinese capacity and know how in this sector? What 
similarities and differences can be identified?  
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Knowing that China is becoming more and more powerful and acquires the necessary 
knowledge to produce without foreign inputs, the transfer of clock & watch technology 
is again at the center of the debate as it happened in Japan with the rise of quartz 
production introduced by Swiss companies at the time. Foreign direct investments are 
very substantial in China, but now Chinese companies aim to take the lead and to 
become independent from foreign firms. 
 
Are Chinese and Hong Kong players competing with the Swiss clock & watch industry, 
including by investing in Switzerland and buying some companies? Is Chinese 
competition also climbing the high technology ladder and starting to compete in higher 
tech segments of the sector, challenging more and more the Swiss supremacy? Are 
Asian producers grabbing more attention and popularity in the luxury segment than its 
Swiss competitors?  
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4. Methodology	  
 
In order to respond to the research questions raised earlier, this paper has to look for 
several sources of existing scientific and empirical knowledge.  
The core hypothesis to be validated or invalidated is that the Swiss clock & watch 
industry, as well as the Japanese industry is under threat, which does not concern the 
entire value chain but parts of it. 
 
First of all, this paper borrows from world economic history and history of 
industrialization in particular, with a specific focus on the industrialization of 
Switzerland. The contribution of micromechanics and the clock & watch industry 
worldwide and in Switzerland will be scrutinized. 
 
Second, it borrows from basic engineering and technological knowledge of the clock & 
watch sector, accessible to the general public, so that global competition can be 
understood in various segments of that industry (low, medium and luxury segments).  
 
Thirdly, economic geography is also needed to understand the industrial landscape of 
the Pearl River Delta and the business linkages between Hong Kong and the South 
Guangdong region, especially vis-à-vis Guanzhou and Shenzhen. 
 
Fourthly, knowledge has to be derived from studies in global production networks, 
international trade and the role of FDI (foreign direct investment), to perceive how the 
Swiss-Asian division of labor has been evolving in the clock & watch sector over recent 
decades.  
 
In addition, this paper also relies on interviews of professionals working in this industry 
in Hong Kong and Switzerland. Different perspectives are exposed from various 
sources of information.  
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5. Conceptual	  Framework	  
 
Theory of industrialization 
Prior to introducing the theory of industrialization, it is important to understand previous 
theories of trades and production, including the theory of mercantilism that promotes 
economic development through the enrichment of nations through external trades, 
properly organized to create a surplus in the trade balance; the first person to introduce 
this theory was Victor Riqueti de Mirabeau in the 18th century. Industrialization plays 
an essential role in social theory. It is often described as the main agent in the 
construction of modern society; Hobsbawn (Hobsbawn, 1968) said: “the industrial 
revolution marks the most fundamental transformation of human life in the history of 
the world recorded in written documents". But others believe that industrialization is 
only one component in a set of changes, including rationalization or urbanization. Berg 
will say: “the industrialization process is an expression of a complex of forces that are 
really rooted in more general processes, in what are most aptly characterized as the 
processes of modernization" (Berg, 1979). There are two main parties: The classic 
liberal theory supported by Durkheim and the critical theory of uneven development 
supported by Marx (Marx, 1867). The first theory believes in “laissez faire” economies 
and the second one criticizes the industrial capitalism. According to Werner Sombart 
(Sombart, 1928), the industrial revolution, which is the turning point in the 
industrialization of the industries, is a phenomenon that already started in the 14th 
century with the emergence of the bourgeois society in Florence, Italy. According to 
Fernand Braudel (Braudel, 1967), the term “industrialization” could define a process, 
which is more or less progressive and not brutal as it is described in the United 
Kingdom. Later on, the French historian, Patrick Verley insisted on the continuity of this 
phenomenon as the driving force of the industry’s growth in the late 17th century and in 
which lays the demand dynamism for consumer goods in order to stimulate technical 
progress (Verley, 1997). Industrialization modified consequently the industrial world in 
the 20th century. As Burnham claimed (Brunham, 2003), during the Industrial 
Revolution, the industrialist put the merchant as a leading actor in the capitalist system 
and influenced the decline of the traditional handcraft skills of artisans.  
 
As a reference, the clock & watch industry industrialized in the 20th century by 
switching from an artisanal production to a factory mass production in the United 
States and Switzerland. Later on, some Asian industries followed the same path with 
Japan and Hong Kong watch industries in the late 20th century. The Industrial 
Revolution led to increased technology intensity, which helped to shape modern 
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society. The concept of “laissez-faire” is the following: “Let-it-be economics: the belief 
that an economy functions best when there is no interference by governments” (The 
Economist, 2015). The invisible hand of the market is the main element of the concept: 
the economy is guided by an organic development. Therefore, institutions and 
government are playing a marginal or secondary role. Adam Smith (Smith, Cannan, 
Lerner, 1937) first introduced the term “invisible hand of the market” in order to 
describe the natural force that drives free market economies. According to him, this 
invisible hand will guide the actors involved in exchanges of goods and services to 
trade in the most mutually beneficial manner, and laissez-faire economics is the best 
strategy to deliver national growth (Brophy, 2002).  
 
On the contrary, the “visible hand” relies on a form of superior authority, including 
governments and monopolistic firms that constrains and surpasses the invisible hand 
in the coordination of economic activities (Chandler, 1977). The laissez-faire concept is 
not applied in all economies, and governments still control the main key sectors as in 
China for example. But the roots of Hong Kong economic governance lay on the 
“laissez-faire” concept. 
 
As mentioned above the Swiss industry entered into the process of industrialization in 
the second half of the 19th century. Three factors enabled the mass production. First, 
the introduction of electrical energy promoted the mechanization of work. Then, the 
population was growing but was not absorbed by the primary sector, thus this 
workforce was used in the workshops of the secondary sector. Finally, this free-trade 
period was another a key factor. The Swiss domestic market was very limited and 
opening its borders to the world could achieve the sales required for profitability. And in 
the absence of protectionist taxes, technical advance was a decisive element in which 
Switzerland had a very good position compared to the competition (Charpilloz, 2003). 
Therefore, the clock & watch industry substantially helped the Swiss economy to move 
from an agricultural economy to a manufacture economy by creating many jobs in the 
secondary sector. 
 
Global value chains and segmentation 
The term “Global commodity chain” is the ancestor of the term “global value chain” 
used today, which defines the whole process of production of goods from the raw 
material to the purchase by the end-consumer. Behind this definition, Gereffi 
distinguished two types of chains: producer-driven chains and buyer-driven chains 
(Gereffi, 1994). In producer-driven chains the main company is the manufacturer that 
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monitors the production system through its network of suppliers, sub-contractors, and 
subsidiaries. In buyer-driven chains, the main company is the retailer that transfers its 
position from its consumer market knowledge, while they outsource most of their 
production. Adam Smith (Smith, 1956) recognized that the existence of the different 
demand of goods and services are based on the Imperfect Competition theory 
(Robinson, 1938). He said that “Market segmentation involves viewing a 
heterogeneous market as a number of smaller homogeneous markets, in response to 
differing preferences, attributable to the desires of consumers for more precise 
satisfaction of their varying wants.” Since then, many other definition of segmentation 
has been suggested but this one was retained for its value and accuracy. This macro 
view of segmentation was then studied more into details and helped to understand the 
apparition of group of consumer responding the same to the marketing mix (Dickson 
and Ginter, 1987). Industries had to adapt their production from low-end to high-end, 
based on these consumer demands in order to satisfy them; the clock & watch industry 
being now segmented as such though different regions of the world. 
 
Network economics and supply chains 
Nagurney (Nagurney, 2003) says that the evolution of physical networks in time and 
space as well as the effect of human decision-making on these networks help to 
develop theories and methodologies that are network-based. Network has impacted 
many disciplines, including economics, biology, engineering, mathematics and physics. 
The concept of network in economics was first introduced by Cournot (Cournot, 1838) 
who stated that “competitive price is determined by the intersection of supply and 
demand curves, and had done so in the context of two spatially separated markets in 
which the cost associated with transporting the goods was also included” (Nagurney, 
1993). Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten (Beckmann, 1956) also clearly 
acknowledged the generalization of networks as a means of theorizing even decision-
making of a company with paths matching production processes and links 
corresponding to renewals as the material moved down from the source to the 
endpoint. The paths then abstracted the production possibilities accessible for a 
company. Zhang, Dong, and Nagurney (2003) have lately generalized to recognize not 
only paths but also chains in networks in order to isolate the “winning” supply chains. 
Paths correspond to processes of production and links can be either interface or 
operation links in this application context (Nagurney, 1993). Supply chain and 
networking are two essential concepts in the clock & watch industry because 
companies producing watches highly depend on suppliers of components and raw 
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materials. The industry is based on networks that work like gears, which have to be 
efficient and reliable in order to deliver the final product. 
 
Large and SME subcontracting linkages 
Subcontracting is a particular form of outsourcing that involves close relations and 
information exchange between companies (Heshmati, 2003). Three main theories can 
explain the process of subcontracting. The first one is the “dualistic approach” which 
considers that large companies have more power than small companies and realize 
benefits at the expense of small subcontractors (Berger and Piore, 1984). The second 
one, called “development approach” is about a positive relationship between large and 
small firms that work together (Watanabe, 1971). Holmes (1986) identified three main 
types of production subcontracting following this approach: capacity subcontracting, 
specialization subcontracting, and supplier subcontracting. In the first case, the only 
part subcontracted by a subcontractor is the fabrication of the product asked. In the 
specialization subcontracting, the decision about the method of production is also on 
the hands of the subcontractor. Finally, the supplier subcontractor is supposed to have 
the full control on the development, design, and method of production. In the 1970s-
80s, subcontracting was seen as a tool for modernization. For example, Watanabe 
claimed, “subcontracting can smooth the path of small enterprises and make them a 
suitable instrument for mass employment creation in developing countries that are 
committed to industrialization” (Watanabe 1971). The third one is the “networking and 
clustering approach”. It consists in understanding subcontracting as support networking 
initiatives and development of industrial clusters (Pyke, 1992). Clusters accrue 
significantly benefits for the industry; firms located in these industrial clusters can act 
as contractors and subcontractors at the same time (Rama, 2003). 
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6. Competition	  versus	  cooperation	  between	  the	  Great	  Hong	  
Kong	  and	  Switzerland	  (Part	  I)	  
6.1. The	  clock	  & watch	  industry	  in	  the	  Great	  Hong	  Kong	  
Region	  
6.1.1. Introduction	  
 
The major characteristics of the capitalist service oriented economy in Hong Kong are 
the free trade policy, the low taxation applied by the local government, the minimum 
public interference, and the strong links with Mainland China and the Asia Pacific 
region. The free market policy refers to the concept of positive non-intervention. It is 
made possible thanks to the maximization of governmental revenue made on property 
taxation, due to the fact that the Hong Kong government controls land ownership in a 
highly urban density setting, and thus does not need revenue from other taxes. A 
minimum wage policy was implemented in 2010, a long time after foreign investment 
has been made in the clock & watch industry. Therefore, all these business friendly 
advantages have attracted many foreign companies. The free trade policy suggests 
that Hong Kong continues to apply no barrier to trade. Thus, Hong Kong does not 
commit taxes on exports or imports of goods. Licensing is also kept to a minimum. The 
natural need to fulfil public obligations to meet public health, security or safety is the 
only case when the local government applies the licensing policy.  
 
However, the Hong Kong government controls some key economic infrastructure, 
including the airport, the port, public transportation, and most importantly the land, 
which provides the major flow of public revenue. The local government plays a kind of 
subsidiary role in between the fifty business elite families of Hong Kong and the Central 
Government and the Communist Party of China. Its major competences focus on urban 
planning and development, infrastructure, and monetary policy.  
 
As of October 2013, more than 210 Swiss companies were based in Hong Kong, with a 
focus in banking, insurance and pharmaceutical as well as in a few other sectors. 
About 110 Swiss companies have their regional headquarters or offices in Hong Kong, 
especially to obtain better access to Mainland China and to other East Asian countries. 
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The biggest trading partner of Switzerland in the clock & watch industry is by far Hong 
Kong. As the figure 6 shows, the trading route towards Hong Kong is the most 
important regarding finished watches ready to be sold in Hong Kong or just in transit to 
be sold in other Asian countries. On the reverse way, most of the product transiting 
between Hong Kong and Switzerland are parts of watches (components) ready to be 
assembled in manufactures in Switzerland.  
 
Hong Kong is the largest market for Swiss watches sold in Asia, which still serves as 
the commercial hub for Asia and bought 20.4% of Swiss watches in 2012. In the 
1980s, Swiss manufacturers started to delocalize their production plants to Hong Kong 
in order to reduce the costs of production.  
 
Swiss manufacturers used to produce various watch components, and ship sent them 
to Switzerland to assemble all the parts. It is still the case nowadays but in smaller 
amounts. Hong Kong and Chinese firms have also started to produce their own 
watches “Made in China”, and to compete with Switzerland at least on cheap range of 
watches. Since the early 1990s, Hong Kong/Swiss manufacturers have started to face 
Mainland China’ s competition producing at cheaper prices and attracting more 
investors. This trend is mainly the result of cross-border delocalization from Hong Kong 
to the Guangdong region and the Pearl River Delta. Hong Kong is then used only for 
the transit of watches and components between Switzerland and China. Hong Kong 
and the Guangdong Province are commonly named the Great Hong Kong in economic 
and trade terms as they are both dependent on each other.  
 
While Hong Kong was industrializing, local manufacturers such as watch producers did 
not receive any type of public assistance. Manpower training, research and 
development, new technology, and the provision of capital to local manufacturers, were 
considered as a failure in technological advance of this country, as well as the lack of 
space to build more production plants (Borrego, J, 1996). 
 
The indirect way the government was involved in the manufacturing sector was by 
trying to attract more industrial investments by making available more industrial land for 
the settlement of manufacturing firms. The problem was that this move was attracting 
large companies and small firms were left aside because of the expensive prices of 
land set by the government.  
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One of the explanations about Hong Kong strong position in the watch industry is the 
city-state benefit of its free market economy that attracted a lot of companies and its 
strategic location in East Asian routes. Swiss companies saw a major opportunity to 
implement production plants there as Hong Kong government let the market develop 
organically.  
 
Regarding the clock & watch industry in China, relations are particularly close with 
Switzerland. Foreign watches, including Swiss watches are re-exported from Hong 
Kong to other Asian countries, including China. Conversely, a number of quartz 
watches and watch components made in China transit through Hong Kong before 
going abroad, especially in the United States but also in Switzerland, or return to 
China. Even though trades between the two countries are slightly decreasing, both 
countries would not be able to survive separately as the industry has become very 
dependent. Switzerland receives a lot of components of watches from China, whereas 
China sells a lot of luxury Swiss made products on the domestic market. The recent 
free trade agreement between Switzerland and China will facilitate even more trade 
within the industry. 
 
The number of watch producers grew in the late 20th century, starting in the 
Guangdong Province, close to Hong Kong, and then expanded in the coastal provinces 
further north. This expansion is the result of the production companies from Hong Kong 
that migrated in neighbor China to reduce costs such as labor. This increase of 
production in Mainland China is becoming a threat that Switzerland should contain 
before those companies gain enough power to direct and lead the Asian market by its 
own. Chinese market took a lot of market shares from Hong Kong in the low-end and 
mass production. Mainland suppliers have eaten a lot of Hong Kong suppliers such as 
Wal-Mart, which produced an important number of watches. It is now only producing in 
China whereas in the 1980s-90s it was producing in Hong Kong.  
6.1.2. Production	  
 
The table below shows that the number of clock & watch enterprises in Hong Kong 
started to increase sharply in the 1980s to reach its apogee between 1980 and 1985 
(Hketoberlin.gov.hk, 2014); it almost reached the same level than Switzerland, knowing 
that the Swiss watch industry was employing nearly 50’000 people after the crisis in the 
1970s, which was the lowest employment rate in the Swiss watch history (Fédération 
patronale, 2015). Then it started decreasing because of the delocalization in the 
 
 
Asian Competition in the Clock & Watch Sector 
Valentin Guidi 
31 
Guangdong region. This shift of production sites will be explained later on the paper. In 
comparison, the Swiss sector was employing 55’816 workers in 2012 (FHS, 2014).  
 
Table 3 - Number of watch companies based in Hong Kong (1960-2014) (GovHK, 
2014). 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 2014 
Enterprises 61 102 229 471 1’509 1’805 1’690 121 
Employees 2’433 4’556 9’773 15’783 49’454 36’692 27’154 887 
Employees as % of 
all manufacturing 
industries 
1.1 1.3 1.8 2.3 5.5 4.3 3.7 0.8 
 
 
As of the year 1994, Hong Kong was still dominating the low-end segment; it overtook 
the Japanese market in 1987 indirectly, through the delocalization of two of the three 
most important watch companies in Japan (Seiko and Citizen) to build production 
plants in Hong Kong. Despite facing competition against the US production of LCD 
(digital) watches in the 1970s, the industry could find a new impulsion with quartz 
movement brought by Japanese firms at that time (Glasmeier, 1994). 
 
Nowadays from a manufacturing point of view, many Hong Kong-based companies 
delocalized to Mainland China; thus the number of production companies sharply 
decreased and it is not anymore a matter of manufacturing but managing the process 
of production in Mainland China. Hong Kong watch industry is more focused and plays 
a major role in the service, management and small production delivery regarding the 
watch industry. The largest production of watches is currently located in the Middle 
Empire and more precisely in the Guangdong Province. The current situation in Honk 
Kong only includes a few production firms that are producing hundreds of watches 
(compared to thousands of watches produced each year in the 1980s). 
 
Several factors helped the city keep the watch manufacturers from delocalizing to 
Mainland China until the 1990s. For example, the international trade law regulated the 
name of origin of a watch to its country of assembly. The minimum wage policy was not 
implemented before 2010, keeping the cost of labor rather cheap. Incentives were 
offered to companies that wanted to produce in Hong Kong; low tax, export, and import 
 
 
  Asian Competition in the Clock & Watch Sector 
  Valentin Guidi 
32 
policies which are a major factor for companies that trades internationally especially in 
the watch industry. But all these features were becoming eroded over the years and 
Mainland China took the advantage in the late 1990s by applying similar policies in 
special economic zones that were created in the country.  
6.1.3. Sales	  
 
The production level of Asian markets is the equivalent of the production in Europe or 
America, sometimes even more advanced in terms of technical capability. But the 
sales segment of the watch industry in Hong Kong has a complete different timeline 
than the production segment. It is very important to make the difference between these 
two segments. In the sales segment, Asian firms are running behind, with Hong Kong 
as the only exception, but only from a retail point of view. 
 
As introduced earlier, the city-state is the most important distribution center of watches 
in the world and is the largest importer of finished watches. As a fact, 20% of Swiss 
finished watches were sold in Hong Kong in 2014. The main consumers in Hong Kong 
are Mainland Chinese coming to Hong Kong with the intention to shop. The 2015 trend 
is showing an increase in sales volume but a stagnation in terms of turnover. The main 
explanation is that Chinese tourists are less wealthy than in previous years and spend 
less while shopping in the city-state (Zaki, 2015). Since the delocalization movement in 
the 1990s, Hong Kong has shifted from a production center to a re-export and retail 
center used by Chinese production to ship their products all around the world (figure 3). 
 
  
 
 
Asian Competition in the Clock & Watch Sector 
Valentin Guidi 
33 
Figure 3 - Composition of Hong Kong Watch Exports, Millions of USD, 1960-2005 
(Donzé, P. 2010) 
 
The fact that the government does not perceive any taxes on watch products is a major 
advantage for Hong Kong. Thus, watches sold in retail stores are cheaper in average 
than in other countries except Switzerland. Historically, Hong Kong has always been a 
major distribution hub thanks to its efficient and reliable transit platforms, including the 
airport and the port of Hong Kong.  
6.2. The	  rise	  of	  domestic	  Chinese	  firms	  
 
Chinese watch companies are emerging in the global competition and can put forward 
some serious advantages that other companies do not have. Tianjin Seagull (founded 
in 1955), Beijing Watch Factory (founded in 1958), and more recently Fiyta (founded in 
1987), which is owned by the government, are Chinese companies growing in the 
middle and high-end segment with international ambitions.  
 
Before the 21st century, Chinese companies were limited to the production segment 
(Original Equipment Manufacturer) in the watch industry. Since then, companies 
acquired the knowledge and the skills to grow by their own thanks to the transfer of 
technology occurring with the delocalization of watch manufactures from Hong Kong to 
China. Nowadays, These companies have the competences to compete with Swiss or 
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American brands in almost all the stages of the global value chain according to 
professionals.1 
 
The will of the Chinese government to reduce watch importations in the 1950s (Byrd et 
Tidrick, 1992) was undertaken by the government itself who currently owns Fiyta and 
launched Tianjin Seagull as well as Beijing Watch Factory to have a certain control 
over the local industry. The country exported 23 times more watches than Switzerland 
in terms of volume, whereas the value exported is 4.5 times inferior to Switzerland 
(Crédit Suisse, 2013). It shows that the country is a very important player in the 
industry and has some important degree of market power.  The table 4 expresses the 
statistics that confirm the significance of this player.  
 
 
Table 4 - China vs. Switzerland in terms of volume and value of exported watches 
in 2012 (Wthejournal.com, 2015). 
 Volume exported (million) Value exported (billion) 
China 678.5 5.1 
Switzerland 29.5 22.95 
 
The Chinese industry started to diversify its activities into the watch industry in the late 
1970s to become a major player in the watch component supplier segment following 
the experience of Hong Kong a couple of decades earlier. It is conjointly the result of 
the delocalization of production firms coming from Hong Kong. 
 
The Chinese government was highly involved in the process of the development of the 
watch industry, firstly, by building local watch companies, but also by creating special 
economic zones (SEZ), in the Shenzhen area in particular. The government 
established these special zones in order to attract FDI by offering special tax and fee 
incentives. The Shenzhen SEZ is located on the boarder with Hong Kong. It facilitates 
trade with Hong Kong, which is a major transit hub in East Asia. The concept lies on 
three main pillars: labor intensive manufactures, technology transfers resulting from 
FDI inflows, and preferential trade arrangements. The successful integration of these 
zones is mainly due to access to low-cost labor, land, and raw materials; size of the 
potential domestic market; and government incentives (Wu, 1997). The local watch 
industry is nowadays well established in the Shenzhen SEZ where more than 200 
                                                
1 Interview with Marco Sieber, CEO and Chairman of TMS Group based in Hong Kong. 
Basel, March 25th, 2015. 
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watch manufactures were located in 2012, forming a ideal logistics cluster to reduce 
transit flows (Pan, 2012).  
 
The current situation is complex in the Chinese watch industry, which is globally 
distributed and horizontally integrated. Two major trends are defining the market. On 
the one hand, the largest and most experienced brands, including Tianjin Seagull, 
Shanghai Watch factory, and Beijing Watch Factory are attempting to move upmarket 
to the high-end segment by producing watch complications (high-end movements) as 
the Swiss brands. On the other hand, several Chinese factories are manufacturing their 
own movements and sell them to other Chinese companies. This has been leading to 
the rise of another type of companies called “mushroom companies” that appear 
overnight and sell their products only online for very cheap prices. Then, they 
disappear as quickly as they had appeared (Sri, 2014). 
 
 
Watches	  trades	   Tariff	  (estimated)	  
applied	  	  
by	  China	  (%)	  
Singapore	   0	  
Thailand	   0	  
Vietnam	   0	  
Malaysia	   0	  
Hong	  Kong	   4.8	  
Switzerland	   11.1	  
USA	   13.2	  
Germany	   13.2	  
Italy	   13.2	  
Japan	   13.2	  
France	   13.2	  
 
 
Looking at the tariff applied and faced by China regarding the watches trades (table 4), 
the strategies implemented by the Chinese government can be analyzed. It is fairly 
clear that imports of watches and parts thereof in China are facilitated for countries 
supplying China in components. Thus, Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia are benefiting 
of free trade policies when exporting watches to China. Then, in the export of watches 
and parts thereof out of China, preferential tariffs are applied to countries that have 
substantial import of watches coming from China such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and 
Watches	  trades	   Tariff	  (estimated)	  
faced	  	  
by	  China	  (%)	  
Singapore	   0	  
Hong	  Kong	   0	  
Thailand	   0	  
Switzerland	   0	  
Malaysia	   0.1	  
Japan	   0.2	  
USA	   0.7	  
Germany	   1.9	  
Italy	   1.9	  
France	   1.9	  
Vietnam	   5	  
Table 2 - Tariffs in China's trade of watches and parts thereof in 2015 (ITC, 2015) 
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Switzerland. Even though other countries do not have important tariff policies when 
importing watches from China. The analysis of tariff related to watches import and 
export helps us identifying the strong will of the Chinese government to facilitate trade 
in the watch industry and promote the production and development of Chinese brand 
internationally.  
 
If Chinese brands are successful moving up market and producing luxury watches, 
how will the consumer market react to the rising supply of watches? Jean-Claude 
Biver, head of Watchmaking at LVMH (Tag Heuer, Hublot, and Zentih Group), one of 
the most influential professional in the watch industry says that "the Swiss watch 
industry has no competition", (Swiss Watch Wire, 2012) the high positioning of the 
Swiss industry is very difficult to reach and the barriers to entry are very high; they are 
not only tangible assets, but also intangible like the brand image, the history, and the 
value of a Swiss Made watch. J.C. Biver  defends his position by saying that "nobody 
will buy a $10,000 watch if it's not Swiss made" (Swiss Watch Wire, 2012), thus 
Chinese brands will have to find a new consumer pool instead of taking consumers that 
are buying Swiss watches.  
6.3. Industry	  segments	  in	  which	  Asian	  companies	  are	  a	  
threat	  
 
Chart 3 - Typical value chain in the watch industry 
 
 
At a macro level, the Great Hong Kong is a threat to the Swiss industry. Its growth 
potential and the ambitions of local Chinese firms confirm the willingness to compete 
on a global scale. The segments in which a company based in the Great Hong Kong is 
a threat to the Swiss industry can clearly be delimited by considering the value chain of 
Raw	  Material	   Design	   Intermediate	  manufactur-­‐ing	   Assembly	   Distri-­‐bution	   Market-­‐ing/Commu-­‐nication	   Brand-­‐ing	   End	  Customer	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a typical company in the industry. On the one hand, China is highly competitive on the 
upstream stages of the value chain, in raw material, manufacturing and assembly. 
Indeed, it already dominates the low-end and mass production segment. For example, 
Wal-Mart, the American retail store has its watch suppliers located in Shenzhen. It is 
the largest client in China in terms of watches orders and the largest watch retailer 
worldwide. Therefore the production plants located in Mainland China (mainly in 
Shenzhen) have a higher power in terms of dependence-relation (Wal-Mart, 2014). On 
the other hand it still lacks of skills and knowledge on the downstream level regarding 
the marketing, communication and relationship with the customer. 
 
Several factors could lead Chinese companies to compete with the leaders in the 
industry: 
 
Firstly, the “Made in China” is often related to poor quality production, but hundreds 
years ago this origin was assimilated to high quality product including silk, porcelain, 
and ceramic. This prestigious history could be used as a marketing tool to move up the 
value chain as some companies are already trying to do. In a near future, the strategy 
should clearly pay off. Since the years 2000, the quality of Chinese products has been 
improved. In the watch industry, Chinese companies such as Fiyta or Tianjin Seagull 
are already producing high-end watches including tourbillions (which is the most 
expensive complication to produce for a watch). The government is also highly 
supporting these brands to raise the quality of watches produced. According to a 
survey (HKTDC, 2010) conducted at the Hong Kong Watch & Clock Fair in 2011, the 
product designs with the biggest growth potential in the Asian market are 
jewelry/gemstone watches as well as automatic movement watches, which reinforces 
the Chinese government’s belief to move up with the quality of products manufactured 
in China and investing in local brands. It is only a matter of time before we see Chinese 
luxury watch brands competing with established luxury companies (CKGSB 
Knowledge, 2012). To go a step further, some Chinese brands are shifting from the 
« Made in China » to the « Created in China », in which designs and development 
belong to the Chinese company itself and help the companies to differenciate from the 
negative perception of « Made in China » (HKTDC, 2014). 
 
Secondly, the Great Hong Kong region is already benefiting from a great infrastructure 
for watch production. Thus, logisitcs and skills to produce are already available, and 
technological skills can compete with global companies. They are even more advanced 
in some sectors of the industry, and they are the most important suppliers of external 
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parts for Switzerland (parts completing the external appearance of the watch). Another 
argument for Chinese brands to move up to the luxury segment is that it is the most 
secure and reliable segment of the industry. In other words, the economic crisis in 
2008 hit the low and middle segments, but the luxury sector did not face any decline in 
terms of sales to the end customer. Therefore, it is a low-risk strategy for the Chinese 
government to invest in the luxury segment in order to avoid external risks that cannot 
be controlled such as a global crisis. 
 
Thirdly, the potential and serious threat coming from the upstream level of the supply 
chain is a positive factor for China. Chinese suppliers of components benefit from a 
large and easy access to raw material needed for the production of watches. The 
location of production plants for such supplies was wisely organized to be close to raw 
materials in order to facilitate their transit (Wu, 1997). The threat is also imminent in the 
production and assembling chains of the industry. This region has a large pool of labor 
force, and extensive hour regulations are much more attractive than in Europe or North 
America. Paradoxically, the quality control is more efficient in China than in Switzerland 
in the low-end and middle-end segments. This is because Chinese companies can 
employ more people for controlling operations, and thus a largest number of watches 
are checked before being send to the retail stores. Marco Sieber, owner of a watch 
company in Hong Kong, noticed that in a collection of Swiss watches, 10 out of 100 
watches have to be sent back because of defects or broken parts; whereas only 1 out 
of 100 watches coming from a Chinese firm has a defect.2 
 
Fourthly, the Chinese consumer market has the biggest potential growth in the next 
decades. It is an important opportunity for Chinese companies because the average 
Chinese consumer purchasing power is increasing every year. Moreover, studies have 
shown that local brands are preferred to foreign brands. Nevertheless, the trends and 
customs in the watch industry are slightly different: so far, the only brands that have 
acquired notoriety and reputation in the high-end segment are Swiss companies. But 
once the Chinese brands such as Fiyta or Tianjin Seagull will reach adequate 
communication skills, they will become serious competitors for Swiss brands. In terms 
of revenue generated, Swiss products dominate the segment of watches with a unit 
price of above CHF1’000 belonging the high-end category. Whereas low-end watches 
segment priced below CHF150 is dominated by domestic brands (HKTDC, 2014). 
 
                                                
2 Interview with Marco Sieber, CEO and Chairman of TMS Group based in Hong Kong. 
Basel, March 25th, 2015. 
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Fifthly, Chinese brands such as Fiyta, Tian Wang, Rossini, and Tianjin Seagull are 
already securing and protecting their market shares from international competition. 
They have patents and proprietary intellectual property rights on their products, in 
which some have invested in the most advanced technologies. They have already 
mastered the three most elaborated complication movements in the industry (tourbillon, 
minute-repeater, and moon phase perpetual calendar), and they are ready to mass-
produce these types of watches (HKTDC, 2014). 
 
The drawbacks of the Chinese watch industry stand somewhere else. Even though 
Chinese companies are bringing a growing threat at the international level in the 
upstream stages of the value chain, they are still in the learning process in several 
areas, including marketing, communication, and customer relations.  
 
The know-how concerning the downstream stages of the value chain in communication 
and marketing areas is still inferior in East Asia compared to Western countries. Swiss 
high-end brands are much more powerful in terms of marketing and communication, 
whereas Asian (China, Hong Kong, and Japan) companies are still following at the 
lower level. Swiss brands are far ahead from Chinese or other Asian brands in terms of 
visibility and communication to consumers. For example, when analyzing the stands of 
Asian, European and American brands presented at the largest watch & clock fair 
Baselworld in Switzerland, it can be clearly seen what brands care the most about their 
visibility. European brands (mainly Swiss) cover the most visible places in that famous 
fair (figure 4), whereas the only Asian-owned company, Corum (red square) is located 
in a corner with limited visibility. Even more striking, Corum before being acquired by a 
Chinese company was located on the first left stand in front of the main entrance with 
the best visibility (Baselworld, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 4 - Floor plan at Baselworld Fair 2015 (Baselworld, 2015) 
 
 
Main 
entrance 
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It shows that Asian brands do not invest on the downstream levels, including 
communication and marketing, but are more focus on the development, innovation and 
production endeavors. The second reason about this change of location at the fair is 
because the group owner of Corum, Kering Group wanted to have all its brands on the 
same stand even though the only Chinese-owned company has the worst location 
allocated (Kering, 2015). As this fair takes place in Switzerland, there is a certain 
protectionism movement occurring within the exhibition in which major actors (Swatch, 
Rolex, and Patek Philippe) have a powerful and influential presence when it comes to 
the dispositions of the stands. Even though a Chinese firm would be willing to 
massively invest for an interesting place, there only a few chance that the company 
receives a visible place on the main floor at the fair. 
 
There is a parallel market in the clock & watch industry that should not be neglected. 
The counterfeit market of watches is very important where 10 millions of Swiss 
counterfeit watches are sold annually. China produces 72% of the counterfeit watches 
worldwide, It is considered as a serious threat that not only Swiss companies are 
facing, but also regarding Japanese as well as American companies (FHS, 2007). The 
consequences for the Swiss watch industry mainly concern the image of the official 
brand. It would impact as a "brand dilution". Indeed, when a product is counterfeit at a 
large scale, customers will tend to shy away from it, preferring to invest in a brand that 
is able to keep intact its symbol of exclusivity, especially for high-end parts (Pittet, 
1997). It would also cause a loss of confidence on the part of potential buyers, who find 
same watches of lesser quality on the market compared to the original. 
 
To conclude, Asian firms are in terms of technical capability a real threat to 
Switzerland. Chinese companies have started to acquire Swiss watch companies to 
obtain the necessary knowledge and skills, and upgrade their brand value in Asia. 
However, the Asian threat is not alarming from the perception and marketing 
viewpoints. Even if downstream stages of the value chain are not threatening the Swiss 
industry, it is not a reason to minimize and neglect the threat because Chinese brands 
will soon be able to focus on that last segments in order to be able to compete on 
every steps of the industry. 
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6.4. Swiss	  Counter	  Measures	  
6.4.1. Swiss	  Made	  label	  
 
In order to defend Swiss products and more precisely Swiss watches, the Swiss 
Federal Council enacted an “ordonnance” regarding the Swiss Made label in 1971  (P, 
B. 2015). It is the first time a Swiss watch was protected by law.  
 
The “Swiss Made” label is the only real reference in Swiss watchmaking matters. The 
Swiss label is not only based on an intrinsic value, but also on criteria defined by law. It 
is a federal order that sets the conditions for a clocks and watches being eligible to 
receive this famous label. To obtain this Swiss certification, a watch must contain a 
Swiss movement (both quartz and mechanical) cased up in Switzerland, and the 
manufacturer has to carry out the final inspection in Switzerland. Regarding the 
movement, it must be assembled and inspected in Switzerland, and produced with 
Swiss components for at least 50% of the total value of the watch components, but 
without adding the cost of assembly. This rule was introduced in order to differentiate 
Swiss watches and increase the standard of production to make the Swiss product 
more exclusive from a quality point of view versus its Japanese competitors that were 
threating the Swiss industry at that time. Since then, it has been the most important 
move made by the Swiss key players and it particularly helped Switzerland moving out 
of the Japanese crisis.  
6.4.2. A	  future	  revision:	  Swissness	  
 
Nowadays, the Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry wants to strengthen the criteria 
of the label to guarantee Swiss brand long-term credibility and value, as well as 
counter rising Asian competition. The aim of the Swissness revision would be to 
increase the rate of Swiss value from 50% to 60% for quartz watches, and from 70% to 
80% for mechanical watches (FHS, 2015). 
 
The Swissness concept is a revision of the current federal law on the protection of 
trademarks and of indications of origin. The Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry 
wants to go from the “Swiss Made” to the “Made in Switzerland” (Theodore Schneider, 
Breitling CEO) and this revision of the Swiss Made label goes in this direction. Because 
the conditions of employment of these indications in general and in Switzerland in 
particular were not established in details so far, the Swiss parliament adopted this 
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revision on June 21, 2013. Therefore, Swissness introduces new criteria to determine 
more accurately the geographical origin of the product or service (not only for 
watches); the law defines to what extend a product can claim the Swiss origin label. 
This new legal basis is also meeting the demand of consumers around the world willing 
to pay more for products stamped Swiss made, and rightly manufactured in 
Switzerland. As a result of this and from the beginning of the administrative tasks, the 
watch industry supported with determination the principle of strengthening the criteria 
defining the Swiss Made label. The new criteria are different for different industries in 
manufacturing and services. In the case of the watch industry, the new law fixes a 60% 
minimum rate of Swiss value for any product. The adoption of the Swissness law 
involves the modification of the existing application “ordonnance” regulating the use of 
the Swiss name for watches since 1971. Therefore, the criteria for obtaining the Swiss 
Made label for watches are modified and strengthened. The watch industry is the only 
Swiss industry to benefit from such a federal order (FHS, 2015b). This new law is the 
logical continuation of the protection of the Swiss watch industry towards the strong 
Asian competition, especially from Mainland China. Reinforcing the rules to produce 
Swiss Made products could go hand-to-hand with the recent agreement signed in 
regard to the free trade policy with Switzerland that could influence companies to 
reduce their prices (Fehr-Bosshard, 2015). However, there is very little chance of 
observing a decrease in watches’ price in the future because of the increasing cost of 
production in the Middle Empire. That would be the drawback of this good news. In 
other words, if a company decides to decrease its prices because of the free trade 
policy and facilitation with Switzerland, it could face problems in the long-term because 
of the rising cost in China.  
6.5. Conclusion	  chapter	  
 
The Great Hong Kong region clock & watch industry is the most important key player in 
the industry together with the Swiss one. Yet, a difference lies between production and 
sales. If the Great Hong Kong region is perceived as a competitor in terms of brand 
productions in Switzerland, it is not the case in the retail sector as it is the largest 
market for Swiss brands, which realize the majority of their sales there (in Hong Kong 
only). Chinese domestic firms aiming to compete in the low-end segment want to 
upgrade their production to move to the middle and high-end segments. This strategy 
is implemented and supported by the Chinese government. To protect its industry, 
Switzerland is implementing new regulations such as the “Swissness” revision in order 
to face rising global competition. To avoid this problem, Chinese companies are 
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expanding through the acquisition of Swiss companies such as Corum or Eterna in 
order to obtain crucial technology transfers and marketing know-how. It also gives 
substantial added value to Chinese companies such as Citychamp Watch & Jewellery 
Group Ltd (formerly known as China Haidian Holding) listed in the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. The trade route between Switzerland and East Asia is the principal and 
most important in the world. This connection is positively and negatively affecting the 
Swiss industry. It allows Swiss companies to outsource part of their production to 
reduce costs of production. However, it gives the opportunity to create their own chain 
of production and provides a solid base to the competition.    
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7. Asian	  competitions	  faced	  by	  Switzerland:	  Comparison	  and	  
differences	  (Part	  II)	  
7.1. Introduction	  
 
The emergence and development of a watchmaking industry in Japan - principally the 
Seiko Company - in the years 1880-1940 appears as the result of a highly successful 
international transfer of technology from Western countries. In particular, Swiss and 
American firms established joint ventures in Japan and produced quartz watches. The 
Japanese watch industry was highly integrated and principally based on the Hattori 
group, which was taken over in the 1930s by the Citizen Company: Hattori also 
revealed to be a leading distributor of Swiss watches, but also a purchaser of chablons 
to dissident houses and exporters of cases’ watches. Hattori also benefited from 
national political support. Its relations with Japanese leaders have played a significant 
role in the adoption of protectionist measures against pro- importing Swiss watches in 
Japan until the mid-1890s. 
 
For the Swiss watch industry, technology transfer to Japan was a failure (from a Swiss 
company point of view), since it gave rise to a formidable industrial and commercial 
competitor. It did not in fact manage to limit the transfer of basic knowledge translated 
to Japanese watchmakers for after-sales service in the Japanese market. The 
construction of an industry competitor revealed internal divisions of a highly 
compartmentalized Swiss watch industry, despite the cartelization of the Swiss watch 
industry (Donzé, 2013), and divided between the competing interests of the major 
exporters of finished watches, favorable to concentrated industrial ion and regulation 
for the chablonnage, and some small manufacturers and producers of movements, 
who saw this practice as a source of income and a way to fight against Hattori giant. 
The divisions and hesitations among Swiss watchmakers greatly explain the lack of 
response to Japanese competition, which was only stopped by WWII.  
 
It is also important to consider the lessons learned from the experiences of the inter-
war period by the Swiss and Japanese watchmaking companies after 1945. The 
Japanese watchmaking, based essentially on Hattori-Seiko and Citizen, then entered a 
new phase of strong growth in 1950-1960, and deeply undermined during the 1970s 
the Swiss dominance in the world market, with the birth of the quartz watch. The role of 
the Swiss watch industry in the reconstruction of its Japanese competitor, and its 
attitude to the commercial and technical successes of the Japanese industry probably 
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enlightened the roots of the Swiss watchmaking crisis of the 1970s and, more 
generally, the history of watchmaking during the second half of the twentieth century. 
 
Since then, Japanese watch firms have started to decline in the 1990s with the 
exceptions of Seiko, Citizen and a couple of other brands. They had to face the 
competition from Swiss luxury brands, which started differentiating their products at 
that time. The Japanese brands were not able to stand that competition race (Donzé, 
P. 2006). 
7.2. Japanese	  competition	  
 
The first serious crisis that hit the Swiss watch industry happened during the 1970s-80s 
with the technological revolution of quartz movements (electrical battery), which almost 
forced the Swiss companies to go bankrupt. This crisis was at the origin of the decline 
of the Swiss watch industry in the 1970s, which chose to keep the traditional 
technology production of mechanical watches, while Japanese companies adopted this 
new technology and contributed to the largest number of watches produced worldwide. 
 
The research & development on electrical watches began in the 1950s, both electro-
mechanical movement and the battery system had to progress in parallel. In 1954, the 
Swiss engineer, Max Hetzel, was the first to develop an electronic wristwatch powered 
by a battery. The Bulova Company then introduced it to the consumer market in 1960. 
In the 1960s, both Swiss and Japanese R&Ds were working on quartz wristwatch 
development. The quartz battery had the capacity to reach an accurate mechanism 
precision. The challenge was to implement and reduce the size of such a system to a 
wristwatch model. Financially independent, Japanese firms were able to conduct 
research on their own. Citizen and Seiko were well-established companies, and had 
the potential to compete on a global scale. At the end of the day, Seiko was the first 
company to mass-produce an analog quartz watch, and such development made the 
Japanese watch sector the most recognized industry to produce quartz watches 
worldwide. Citizen and Casio benefited from their popularity thus boosting their global 
sales. Facing this revolution, the Swiss industry repositioned itself to the high-end 
segment of watch production in order to differentiate their mechanical products to the 
quartz and battery-powered products. To do so, the Swiss Made label helped 
communicating a different positioning of Swiss watches vis-à-vis Japanese competitors 
(Young, 1999). 
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Japan has been the only country to temporarily defeat the Swiss hegemony during the 
1970s-80s. However, statistics show that Japan has become nowadays a mere 
shadow of what it was at that time. The value exported from Japan in 2013 was 16 
times less than its equivalent from Switzerland, whereas it was only 6 times less in 
2001 (ITC, 2015). But it is important not to neglect that a couple of companies still 
remains at the top of world watch classifications in terms of profit-making results. 
Citizen, Seiko, and Casio are still key global players having respectively 3.9%, 3.4%, 
and 2.1% of market shares worldwide in 2014, ranking them among the top 10 
(Statisticbrain.com, 2015). The decline of Japanese watch production is paradoxically 
due to the quartz revolution that brought Japanese firms to the top of the watch 
industry. This innovation opened up the industry to new market locations, including 
Hong Kong and Mainland China due to the localization of low costs and skills there.   
7.3. A	   comparison	   between	   Japan	   and	   the	   Great	   Hong	  
Kong	  Region	  
 
Chart 4 - Watch and Clock Export of Hong Kong, Japan, and Switzerland (JCWA, 
2015. Crédit Suisse, 2013. Donzé, 2010) 
 
 
Before the 1980s, the situation was more or less the same for each country with a 
slight advantage for Switzerland that was exporting more (Chart 4). When the Quartz 
revolution occurred during the 1980s, Japan lost shares in terms of value, whereas 
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Switzerland and Hong Kong kept growing after 1990. Hong Kong took the opportunity 
to produce quartz movements, and Japan had to face rising competition and lost 
market shares. Switzerland had always a lower volume of production but its products 
were sold at higher prices over the years (Donzé, 2010). The volume of units produced 
by Japan sharply decreased in 2000 because of the strong competition against Great 
China that forced Japanese firms to delocalize their production. Japan had to find a 
solution to counter-balance this negative trend, and opted to produce only movements 
instead of finished watches. 
7.3.1. Discussion	  of	  the	  low-­‐end	  segment	  
 
The main similarity between its two competitors, Japan and Hong Kong that 
Switzerland had to face is that the low-end segment of production was involved. 
Barriers to entry were much lower than for the high-end segment, which required high-
skilled labor and specific know-how to produce luxury watches. In addition, few 
companies were able to sell high-end watches when they entered the clock & watch 
market. Any company needs at least a couple of decades of experience to establish 
itself as a luxury watch brand manufacturer if it is not a Swiss brand. Therefore, 
Japanese as well as Great Hong Kong companies started to compete at the inferior 
levels of the market in order to have a chance to dislodge the leadership of Swiss 
companies. This strategy paid off as the Great Hong Kong took advantage over Japan, 
which was forced to change its production strategy to focus on movements rather than 
finished watches.  
7.3.2. Competition	  and	  Swiss	  deficiencies	  
 
Switzerland did not protect enough watch intellectual property, and Asian competitors 
used this deficiency. Switzerland took counter-measures with the adoption of the Swiss 
Made label and now with the revision of the label to strengthen the criteria related to 
the “Swissness”.  
 
Switzerland was not protected enough before Japanese companies took important 
market shares from Swiss companies. The same scenario happened with Chinese 
companies entering the industry. The main deficiency of Swiss companies was that 
they failed to protect their knowledge and leading role in the industry. Even though the 
Swiss Made label helped to defend its products, it is complicated to prevent any form of 
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competition which will remain in the future despite the reinforcement of criteria for 
Swiss watch production to differentiate at the highest level possible. In other words, if 
Switzerland is able to protect its watches in a more efficient manner, a task which is 
however almost impossible, it would avoid many issues related to competition.  
7.3.3. Swiss	  companies	  moved	  to	  upper	  markets	  
 
As Switzerland had already experienced a crisis when Japan invested in the low-end 
production with quartz movements, the competition with Hong Kong could not have the 
same origin. After the Japanese companies challenged the Swiss ones, the positioning 
of Swiss brands strengthened their differentiation in the high-end segment. Therefore, 
when the Great Hong Kong started to compete in the low-end segment, Swiss 
companies were already well repositioned and were not affected by this new 
competition. On the contrary, Swiss brands started to invest in Hong Kong and 
Mainland China to produce components and reduce costs. In parallel, Hong Kong 
became the largest retail center of Swiss watches in the world. 
7.3.4. Collaboration	  with	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  competition	  
against	  Japan	  
 
If we look at the retail segment and therefore the sale channels, Hong Kong is clearly a 
strong partner for Switzerland because of the high percentage of Swiss watches sold in 
this market. As a fact, Swiss companies such as Rolex or Omega have respectively 64 
and 42 official retail stores in Hong Kong compared to 4 and 7 official retailers in 
Geneva (Rolex, 2015. Omega, 2015). The dependence that Switzerland has towards 
Hong Kong can become alarming if sale trends start decreasing in the future. 
Moreover, the competition coming from this region is due to the production of watches 
in the Guangdong Province. Therefore the relation between the two regions is not only 
in competing against eachother but also collaborating. When Switzerland was 
competiting with Japan, the situation was different as there was no collaboration on 
both sides. Both parties were completely independent from each others and acted as 
competitors. 
7.3.5. Coming	  from	  one	  technological	  revolution	  
 
The Japanese competition was the reflection of a technological revolution. This 
innovation was developed concurrently in Switzerland and Japan. Japan has not 
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benefited from the help of another country in terms of foreign direct investments as 
Hong Kong did. Domestic brands such as Seiko or Citizen were at the origin of this 
competition, whereas, the development of the watch industry in Hong Kong was later 
on mainly induced by FDI and foreign companies. The Hong Kong competition was not 
based as a technical innovation: quartz battery was already in existence since the 
1990s (quartz movements are the main component for low-end products in which Hong 
Kong production was based on). But Hong Kong largely benefited from international 
investments. To sum up the situation, the Japanese competition was based on 
domestic factors that supported the development of the quartz revolution, whereas the 
Hong Kong competition was supported by foreign investments and not based on a 
technological innovation, as quartz already existed. 
7.3.6. The	  concentration	  of	  the	  Japanese	  watch	  
industry	  
 
The Japanese industry was highly concentrated on a few companies that generated 
the largest part of the national production of watches. The quartz development was 
made by one of these companies, Seiko. When the Japanese watch companies 
decided to diversify their activities and invest less in the clock & watch business in the 
late 1990s, the Japanese industry gradually lost shares vis-à-vis the Great Hong Kong 
industry that was growing year after year gathering many watch companies ready to 
grow. As a fact, Seiko lost two-third of its sales volume between the year 1990 and 
2009. Since just a few key players were driving the national industry, the decrease in 
revenue happened very fast in Japan. This change of strategy by Japanese companies 
help to shape the success of the Great Hong Kong. But its success was also due to the 
high competition that occurred into the market that pushed numerous companies 
towards innovation. The FDI invested in the region since 1980 was a non-negligible 
source of financing too (Donzé, P. 2010b).  
7.4. Other	  flows	  of	  competition	  
7.4.1. New	  competition	  for	  Japan:	  The	  Great	  Hong	  Kong	  
 
Beside the competition that Switzerland faced and is facing, other regions are 
competing in the watch & clock industry. We tend to forget that if the Great Hong Kong 
is a threat to Switzerland, it is also a menace vis-a-vis Japan and the United States. As 
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the Great Hong Kong produces low-end products as well as both Japan and the US, 
competition is fierce. 
 
Japanese firms such as Seiko, Citizen, or Casio started to delocalize production to 
Thailand and Malaysia in the 1990s in order to reduce production costs and be more 
competitive. Then, the diversification of activities of these three companies, as well as 
the shift of production strategy to produce only movements instead of finished watches, 
made the Japanese watch industry declining in terms of value exported and above all 
in terms of volume produced. This transition happened during the 1990s (Donzé, 
2010b).  
 
The current situation of these three companies is such that their main revenue is not 
generated from watch sales, which represents only 28% of Seiko’s turnover for 
examples. It does not mean that Japanese watch industry is dying as the Casio G-
Shock watch statistics show with more that 50 millions units sold before 2010; Casio 
has the top share of the global market for radio-controlled watches (Casio, 2012). 
7.4.2. Smartwatches	  
 
The new and trendy innovation is called smartwatch. These connected wristwatches 
are creating a new competition in the clock & watch industry. Professionals have split 
opinions when it comes to predict the future of this new product range. Some see the 
smartwatch as a threat for the traditional products, whereas others claim that it will not 
affect the sales of traditional watches and companies could seize new opportunities. 
For example it will allow high-end brands to sell their own smartwatches at a lower 
price than traditional watches and thus acquire new consumers in those lower 
segments. However it is going to be interesting to see if the smartwatch innovation will 
challenge the industry, especially Switzerland that does not seem much concerned 
about it until now. What will be the impact of this second technological revolution (after 
the quartz revolution) on the industry? Is Switzerland protected enough and product 
differentiated to avoid a direct competition coming from these new products? The 
future will give the right answer. It is too early to observe its impact as the first 
smartwatch was launched in 2012 (Price, 2014). But a clear message is sent to the 
traditional industry, including Switzerland with the plan to substitute traditional watches 
in the future. 
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7.4.3. China	  versus	  Hong	  Kong:	  competition	  or	  
interdependence	  
 
If a common belief tends to think about a competition between the city-state and 
Mainland China, the reality is much different. The particular interdependence between 
China and Hong Kong was strengthened during the process of industrial liberalization 
in Mainland China. Even if they are two distinct entities, they both work together and 
cannot be broken up in any case.  Beijing wanted the control of Hong Kong so hard 
because the city had everything China wanted: international connection, wealth, and 
memberships in trade organizations. Those advantages would help China to pull out of 
their communist isolation and it would give incentive to modernize and industrialize the 
country. With the assistance of Hong Kong, China became the second largest 
economy in the world in less than 20 years (Makinen, 2014).  
 
The delocalization of watch factories from Hong Kong to Mainland China should not be 
perceived as a « competition» won by Mainland China, but as a gradual evolution and 
convergence between the two sides of the border. The Hong Kong watch industry is 
more focused on clock & watch retail and service, sale management and delivery, 
whereas China (Shenzhen more precisely) concentrates on mass-production of 
watches and components of watches. To give an example of this collaboration, the 
Chinese government offers special tax reliefs for companies producing in Shenzhen 
and dealing with Hong Kong. Watches produced in Hong Kong and imported in China 
are exempted of any taxes, whereas watches coming from other countries have to pay 
17% to 25% of tax duties.3 
 	  
                                                
3 Interview with Jeffrey Chong, Executive director at Edwin Watch Z Laboratory LTD in 
Hong Kong. Basel, March 25th, 2015. 
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7.5. Erosion	  of	  the	  Swiss	  Luxury	  watches	  image?	  
 
Chart 5 - Keyword comparison « Swiss watches » vs. « Luxury watches » on 
Google Trends (Google.com, 2015) 
 
 
The Swiss watch industry is closely associated to watch quality and to its supremacy 
on the high-end segment of the sector. But looking at the past and current trends that 
concern the luxury and Swiss watches, we can question futures trends. A very 
interesting and reliable tool can be used to analyze those assumptions using Goggle 
Trends. Industry’s trends can easily be connected with Internet trends by comparing 
sets of keywords related to the industry and understand how trends are moving 
forward.  
 
Google Trends shows how regularly a specific search-term is entered, where the Y-
axis corresponds to the total search-volume through distinct regions of the planet 
(Google.com, 2015). The chart 5 compares two keywords, “Swiss watches” and 
“Luxury watches”. By choosing the first set of keywords, the popularity of Swiss 
watches is demonstrated over the years. The second set of keywords was chosen in 
order to have a popularity overview of watches worldwide without preference for a 
specific country. These two sets of keywords show two distinct trends, “Swiss watches” 
is clearly used less and less over time, whereas “luxury watches” is slightly increasing 
over the years. Does this mean that Swiss watches are no longer associated with 
luxury watches and that other countries are getting more popular? It is hard to give a 
straight answer, but one point is clear: the Swiss watches popularity is getting eroded 
as less people are looking for this set of keywords over the Internet. Soon, the term 
“luxury watches” will be written more often than “Swiss watches”. To complete this 
assumption and to find which countries are more active regarding the term “luxury 
watches”, the figure below gives some indications.  
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Figure 5 - Regional interest for « Swiss watches » and « Luxury 
watches »  (Google.com, 2015) 
 
 
These maps show the regional interest of the set of keywords analyzed. The result is 
stunning. On the one hand, the interest for “Swiss watches” originates mainly from 
Western countries and less from Asian countries. On the other hand, the term luxury 
watches is much more used in Asia compared to the rest of the world. Thus, the 
conclusion is that Swiss watches are declining in terms of popularity, and may be soon 
overtaken by the generalized term “luxury watches” that no longer refers to Swiss 
quality as it used to be.   
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7.6. Conclusion	  chapter	  
 
Figure 6 - Key Trade Relationships for China and Hong Kong in the Watch Market 
(Crédit Suisse, 2013) 
 
	  
To sum up the situation, we can mention all the different competitions that the clock & 
watch industry experienced and is experiencing at the moment. As the map above 
shows, we can identify the major key countries that drive the watch industry nowadays. 
The route between Switzerland and Hong Kong is the most important and this bilateral 
relationship is not a competition but tends to be more a cooperation. The Hong Kong – 
China route is also very important and their existing interdependence is seen as 
cooperation rather than competition.  
 
Regarding competition within the industry, the Great Hong Kong region is taking 
important market shares from the Japanese and American industries, but essentially in 
the low-end segment.  
 
The Swiss industry is not much concerned as it is positioned in the middle and high-
end segments. One should not forget that the high-end positioning is partly the result of 
the competition between Switzerland and Japan that happened in the 1970s-80s when 
the Swiss industry had to undertake major changes in order to resist to Japanese 
competition. 
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Attempts to create a new competition mainly focus on technology development as the 
Japanese did so with electrical battery. On this occasion, multinational technology 
companies such as Apple Inc. or Google Inc. are currently developing smartwatches 
(computerized wristwatches), which could potentially threaten once again the Swiss 
watch industry. Considering the price ranges offered by two brands, an Apple Watch 
and a Tissot watch positioned in the same range, a potential competition is sketched. 
However, it is too early to judge whether or not this could negatively or positively 
influence the industry. The consumer could see this technological innovation as a 
completely different product that would not enter in the same competition than 
traditional watches as many professionals claim that smartwatches simply do not fit in 
the same type of market. It could be compared to the wine industry by saying that a 
Bordeaux wine could suffer from a new energy drink recently introduce to the market 
(Roulet, 2014). 
 
First and foremost, the future of watchmaking does not seem threatened. However, it 
will face some new challenges in the coming years, including competition coming from 
other categories of luxury goods. Could the watch suddenly become outdated? The 
role of chronometer watches lost its weight compared to mobile phones and computers 
although it is more a status symbol, conveying values. But if customer behaviors are 
likely to change over time, as modesty and restraint would become a new tendency, 
the industry would face a major issue (Crédit Suisse, 2013). This is why Swiss watch 
companies tend to diversify their activities by investing in other sectors such as aviation 
and space industry with Zenith SA (Zenith Watches, 2015), or other technological 
sectors (Tag Heuer partnership with Google (Tag Heuer, 2015)), but that still have a 
link with the clock & watch industry.  
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8. Contribution	  to	  theoretical	  knowledge	  
 
The primary aim of this research project is to prove that there are substantial threats, 
mainly coming from East Asian countries, diminishing the incontestable leader in the 
clock & watch industry: Switzerland. It is contributing to theories introducing concepts 
of competitions in the industry and all the existing facts about trades and relationship 
Switzerland has with other watch producer regions.  
 
So far most studies and analysis have shown a macro situation of the competition that 
Switzerland is facing, but did not go into the deep elaboration of the subject.  
 
In this study, the author tried to clearly identify the threats and their positions as well as 
their potential for growth. This has led to a distinct conclusion that explains the relation 
that the Swiss industry has with East Asian countries in the clock & watch industry, 
which is not necessarily a competition but also a collaboration that is favorable and 
threatening for both parties at the same time. On the one hand, Switzerland has the 
opportunity to reduce costs by producing some parts of watches and thus be price-
efficient. On the other hand, allowing Asian companies to share the know-how and 
production processes give rise to a potential competition that become more important 
year after year. 
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9. Contribution	  to	  empirical	  knowledge	  
 
Generally speaking, the research is contributing to knowledge discussing ideas about 
trends and presumption of the clock & watch industry worldwide. 
 
While analyzing the competition that Switzerland faced, the weakening trend of Swiss 
watches notoriety over the world was demonstrated. The research proved this trend by 
some facts gathered on the Internet. Moreover, this dilution of notoriety is correlating 
with the enhancement of watch’s interest in Asian countries such as Singapore, Hong 
Kong, or Malaysia.  
 
The trade relation between Switzerland and China was analyzed in such a way that the 
implementation of the free trade policy between the two countries will not have a 
notable impact on trades. The deduction made in this case is a supposition that 
companies will not reduce their prices because of the rising cost of production in China.  
 
This paper is also revealing existing competitions between Asian countries that are not 
expressed enough in studies, appointing the Sino-Japanese competition in the low-end 
segment of the industry for example. We often take for granted the fact that Asian 
countries are competing against the rest of the world, although the first competition for 
these regions is coming from an inter-regional point of view. 
 
Finally, by combining two different competitions (Japanese and Chinese), the 
arrangement reveals some identical facts that could be useful to identify different 
deficiencies on the Swiss clock & watch industry.  
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10. Perspectives	  for	  further	  research	  
 
As this paper discusses different competitions in the Swiss clock & watch industry, 
further researches could focus on the possible threat coming from smartwatches. 
Professionals have different arguments about the possible impact of this new 
technology over the clock & watch industry in general. Therefore, many questions 
remain unresolved at the moment.  
 
Another development of this research could be about the production’s projection in 
Mainland China in several years. Many professionals talk about a delocalization to 
cheaper countries in order to reduce cost, but the main challenge is to delocalize the 
whole supply chain that has to be centralized, as it is the case now in the Great Hong 
Kong. However, it theoretically reduces the attractiveness of decentralization out of 
Mainland China. 
 
The research offers a foreword to the analysis of the image of Swiss watches in the 
world. To develop this point, it would be interesting to compare the statistics of Swiss 
watches sold and the impact of the Swiss image in the consumer mind over the years. 
This analysis would be more subjective, but could reveal some issues not identified by 
theoretical analysis based on numbers and facts. 
 
Last but not least, many professionals, including Jean-Claude Biver express their 
positivity towards the future of the Swiss clock & watch industry. However, it would be 
interesting to analyze a worst-case scenario regarding the impact of a strong decrease 
in sales of Swiss watches in the future and identify the outcomes of such a case. The 
comparison with the current threats expressed in this research would be evaluated 
afterwards.  
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11. Conclusion	  
 
The Swiss watch & clock industry faced and is still facing a competition coming from 
different regions of Asia. It is important to understand the origin of these threats 
potentially harmful for the Swiss industry in order to address the right priorities and to 
develop the industry avoiding additional complications in the future. Prior to these 
competitions, the Swiss industrialization was initiated by the past competition against 
the Americans, which forced the industry to develop and be more internationally 
competitive, having a positive impact on the development of the Swiss economy. It 
makes sense that Switzerland had to compete with other countries that were important 
players in the industry, thus not only United States who was a major producer of 
watches, but also Japan with its technological knowledge and China having a cost 
advantages, entered into battle with Switzerland. The interdependence between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong played a major role in the development of 
watchmaking in China, even though two distinct stages of the industry have to be 
differentiated in order to understand the threats coming from this region. The research 
could identify a positive collaboration for Switzerland on a “sales” point of view 
regarding Hong Kong and a menace coming from the “production” point of view 
regarding manufacturing and other upstream processes in Mainland China. Therefore, 
the situation is not alarming for the Swiss industry in the first instance. However, Swiss 
companies should find a solution to reduce the threat, because the Chinese 
government is highly supporting the upgrade of Chinese watch production; one such 
measure being the revision of the Swiss Made label. Moreover, the comparison of the 
two last major competitions, Japan and Great Hong Kong, demonstrated different weak 
points of the Swiss industry in which competitors found deficiencies to exploit. The lack 
of protection of Swiss products and know-how, as well as the introduction of technical 
revolution are some issues the Swiss industry faced. Identifying the particularities of 
each competitor such as the high concentration of companies in Japan and the cost 
efficiencies in China provides a great illustration of the problem. One of the most 
alarming concerns is about the notoriety of the image of Swiss watches around the 
globe, which is decreasing while luxury watches seem to gain in importance. Is this the 
starting point of the decline in the Swiss clock & watch industry?  
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Appendix	  1:	  Interview	  with	  Marco	  Sieber	  (CEO	  and	  Chairman	  of	  
TMS	  Group	  based	  in	  Hong	  Kong).	  Baselworld	  Fair,	  25	  March	  
2015.	  
 
1. Did the perception of the Swiss industry regarding Hong Kong has changed between 
1970s and now? Is there a vision of threat regarding this region for CH? 
 
In terms of customers, the Great Hong Kong and more precisely Hong Kong are seen 
as the cash cow of the industry from the Swiss watch companies, as a key market with 
the biggest pool of potential customers. Thus coming from a sale prospective. 
 
But the threat is coming from a production point of view because of cheap labor and 
also because of the technology to produce that is getting more and more sophisticated. 
 
Therefore, in terms of technical capability and technology-wise Asian firms are a threat 
to Switzerland but from the perception and marketing point of view the threat is not 
alarming. 
 
2. Is the Swiss industry taking measures to limit this competition? 
 
First, the measures in place to counter the threat are aiming to protect the Swiss 
production with the Swiss Made label in order to differentiate and increase the standard 
of production to make the Swiss product more exclusive from a quality point of view. 
The Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry wants to go from the “Swiss Made” to the 
“Made in Switzerland4. In other words, they want to increase the percentage of 
production required in Switzerland from 70% to 80% in order to protect Swiss watches 
from Asian competition. 
 
3. Is the threat more important with the competition with China and Hong Kong or 
during the Japanese in the 1970s? 
 
After the painful experience of competition in Japan in the 1970s, Swiss companies 
learned from it to anticipate the new threat and took measures to counter. The threat 
that should be more serious is regarding Japan, because the Chinese market took a lot 
of Japanese market shares in which the segmentation is much more similar to it with 
                                                
4 Theodore Schneider’s citation, Breitling’s CEO 
 
 
Asian Competition in the Clock & Watch Sector 
Valentin Guidi 
67 
low-end products based on quartz movements but also automatic movements at 
affordable prices. In this case China is now copying Japanese movements but also 
improving sometimes like Miyota movements owned by Citizen (Japan) that are very 
efficiently copied by Chinese brands.  
 
4. Is there a tendency from Hong Kong or China to upgrade to the next level and 
produce more high-end watches? 
 
Hong Kong has reduced the mass of production and produced fewer amounts of 
pieces. Those mass production factories have moved to Mainland China in the late 
1990s.  
Regarding the technical capabilities, Chinese brands are learning from its competitors 
but they are still not yet at the same level as the global competition. Even though they 
have the potential to reach it. Another lack of know-how is concerning the downstream 
stages of the value chain in the communication channel and marketing to consumers. 
Swiss high-end watches are much more powerful in terms of marketing and 
communication whereas Asian companies are still following at the lower level. 
However, technology-wise they are at the same level or even more advanced than 
their competitors in Europe or America.  
 
5. Can China and Hong Kong become completely independent towards Switzerland? 
 
Chinese brands are almost becoming independent and it is just a matter of time for this 
to happen. The last step they need to reach is the marketing experience in order to 
compete with Switzerland and other mature markets. Chinese companies have bought 
Swiss companies to acquire the know-how and the technology, thus they have almost 
all the pieces of the puzzle to have their own value chain process.  
 
6. Is China taking some market shares to Hong Kong or other countries?  
 
From a manufacturing point of view, many Hong Kong-based companies delocalized to 
Mainland China and now there is no more production in Hong Kong. Hong Kong watch 
industry is more focused in the service, management and small production delivery. 
Mainland suppliers have eaten a lot of Hong Kong suppliers in the low-end segment 
and mass production market (Walmart being the major customer).  
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7. Is it only an issue of delocalization of foreign production to China, or do we observe 
the rise of domestic Chinese capacity and know-how in this sector? 
 
There is an important increase of capacity coming from the Mainland Chinese brands 
that are becoming more and more independent and growing by their own. 
 
8. How do you explain the acquisition of Swiss brand (Eterna, Corum) from Chinese 
companies? 
 
There are several reasons why Chinese brands acquire Swiss Brand. First, technology 
transfer is a very important argument to have. Then, the marketing know-how also 
plays an important role in these acquisitions. Finally, it gives a lot of value to these 
Chinese companies listed on stock exchanges and increases their portfolios. 
 
9. The transfer of technology coming from Switzerland has failed so that local firm can 
work by themselves? 
 
Even though the transfer of technology coming from Switzerland was not protected 
enough, those local firms still have the distribution side to manage as well as the 
marketing process. Moreover, if they want to keep the same standards than Swiss 
companies, they will have to produce and keep a foot in Switzerland. But protecting the 
technology and know-how is very difficult, nearly impossible to protect. 
 
10. What are the advantages to produce in China or Hong Kong?  
 
Hong Kong is no longer a production place, it has switched to a service place in sales 
and management sectors. 
 
First, the efficiency in terms of time is an advantage to produce in China. Second, The 
quality control is much more strict than in Switzerland because there are more people 
controlling the product, thus the quality of watches supplied are more secured and cost 
saving (Switzerland: 10 out of 100 watches are broken. China-Hong Kong: 0 to 1 out of 
100 are broken). Finally, the cost of labor is cheaper in China than in HK or elsewhere 
in the world. 
 
11. How transparent is the industry in Hong Kong or China? Is it more transparent in 
Switzerland? 
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The transparency of the Asian market is less transparent than the European or 
American one in terms of financial aspects. They are emerging markets in which it is 
difficult to control and have rules concerning all the points of the industry. Another lack 
of transparency is about the accuracy and reliability of the figures and statistics; it is 
very difficult to have a clear vision of the performance even though we can clearly 
define the major trends and key players. 
 
12. Is there a tendency to use Hong Kong as a transit platform more than a production 
center? 
 
Hong Kong is still the main hub for meeting clients, partners and shipments. Logistic is 
more convenient for small and medium companies as well as for high-end products. 
But the mass-market production is not any more transiting by Hong Kong and products 
are directly shipped from Shenzhen to United States mainly. Small companies do not 
interest shipping companies in Shenzhen, thus they go through Hong Kong to ship 
their production. But the large companies that are in the mass-market have facilitators 
and consumer service in Shenzhen.  
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Appendix	  2:	  Interview	  with	  Jeffrey	  Chong	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  director	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Edwin	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  Laboratory	  LTD	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  Hong	  Kong).	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25	  March	  2015.	  
 
 
1. How do you see Hong Kong watch industry in 5-10 years? 
 
Hong Kong will act as a trading center (transiting platform) for the watch industries as 
well as headquarters for many companies producing in China because of the know-
how in the industry and attractive tax policy.  
  
2. How do you see China watch industry in 5-10 years? 
 
As the living standards of Chinese are increasing, costs of production are increasing 
too. Therefore, production companies are planning to move out of China to go to 
Vietnam or Thailand. There will probably be a global delocalizing trend of all the 
component production companies to move together out of China and choose a 
cheaper place to produce.  
 
Only the really strong players will remain in China and they will focus on high-end 
products, whereas lower-price products will not survive there. There is already a trend 
in which Chinese production site are delocalizing to Vietnam or Thailand. 
 
3. What are the Industrial zones/clusters for watch companies? 
 
Shenzhen regroups most of the watch companies, because those companies were 
delocalized from Hong Kong to Shenzhen. The reason why companies are around this 
area is because all the components production companies are located there. Logistics 
issues will appear if companies decide to produce out of these areas. 
 
4. Do you know something about Shenzhen and Hong Kong collaboration (government 
agreements…)?  
 
China government offers special tax reliefs for companies producing in Shenzhen and 
dealing with Hong Kong. For example, watches produced in Hong Kong and imported 
in China are exempted of any taxes, whereas watches coming from another countries 
have between 17% to 25% of tax duty. 
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5. Other 
Shops in Macau (Pawn shops) are used for money laundering. People go to these 
shops located next to the casinos; they buy a watch and resell it directly to the same 
seller but with a small commission taken by the seller. 
 
 
